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RECENT BOOKS
THE SUPREME COURT:

CONSTITUTIONAL REvoLUTION

IN

RETROSPECT.

By Bernard Schwartz. New York: The Ronald Press Co. 1957. Pp. vii,
429. $6.50.
It is apparent to any student of the subject that our constitutional
law has undergone an extensive overhauling during the past twenty years,
and it is accurate to say that we have experienced a period of constitutional
revolution via the peaceful method of the judicial process. Professor
Schwartz in his excellent book has undertaken an appraisal of this development. Chapter by chapter he reviews the major decisions and developments
during the period under review in all the important areas of constitutional
adjudication. But while the book provides an accurate and well organized
picture of the course of the decisional law, the author has been concerned
also to depict the major emphases and trends, the direction in which
judicial review is moving, and in tum to state his own appraisal of these
emphases and trends. It· is a very useful and stimulating part of Professor
Schwartz's book that he subjects decisions and opinions to critical examination and states his own views in a straightforward way.
Two major facets of our constitutional development as reflected in
the decisional process in the recent decades have been, first, the expanded
interpretation of the Commerce Clause power in order to enlarge the
range of the federal government's legislative authority in dealing with
the nation's economic problems and, secondly, the reduced significance, if
not complete elimination, of the Due Process Clause as a source of substantive rights in restricting the power of Congress and of the states to
deal with economic affairs. On the whole, Professor Schwartz approves of
these two major developments since they reflect the policy of judicial selfrestraint and deference to the -legislative body which he regards as vital
to the process of judicial review in the sphere of constitutional litigation.
(Pp. 10-38, 367-372) It is apparent that Professor Schwartz subscribes to
the Holmes-Frankfurter theory of judicial austerity, i.e., that the courts
in deference to legislative power and policy should refrain from declaring
legislation unconstitutional as long as the Court finds that the legislative
scheme does not lack rationality. Indeed Professor Schwartz states that
judicial review is essentially undemocratic in character, that the Court by
very nature will lag behind public opinion and that judicial review accordingly should be sparingly exercised in deference to the democratic process.
(Pp. 7-10, 370-372) He regards the Commerce Clause interpretations and
the decline of substantive due process at least in its economic liberty
connotations as desirable manifestations of the kind of judicial selfrestraint which he believes to be imperative. Moreover, Professor Schwartz
regards these recent lines of decisions which have enlarged the Commerce
Clause and drained the Due Process Clause of much of its earlier meaning
as a healthful and desirable return to earlier lines of authority which
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evidenced the same type of judicial restraint which the Court is now displaying. Whether or not Professor Schwartz is correct in his assertion
that the Court is merely restoring its earlier correct positions depends of
course on presuppositions as to the point in time when the correct practice
was found. That John Marshall's thinking expressed in McCulloch v.
Maryland,1 and Gibbons v. Ogden2 should serve as a pattern for the
operation of the judicial process in construing congressio:µal powers is
readily understandable. But what was the initially correct position on
the interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restraint on the power of the states? No easy answer suggests
itself.
To say that Professor Schwartz approves of major developments that
evidence considerable judicial self-restraint in the review of -legislative
acts is not to say that Professor Schwartz is uncritical of the Supreme
Court's decisions during the recent decades. On the contrary, he evidences
on the whole a conservative approach to constitutional interpretation
and is concerned that the Court exercise its proper function in our judicial
system. The point he stresses is that the Court concern itself with questions
of constitutional power and that it not confuse questions of power with
questions of wise policy. The Court should not sit as a super-legislative
body. The author's overall position appears to be that the Court should
not invalidate legislation unless it either violates an express prohibition
of the Constitution or unless it is an unreasonable exercise of legislative
power. (P. 59) But the Court should not confuse "reasonableness" with
"rightness." (P. 310) Moreover, the judges of the Supreme Court should
not make their own conceptions of values the standards of constitutional
interpretation. It may be noted for instance that the author is critical of
the idea expressed in a number of Supreme Court opinions during the
1940-1950 decade to the effect that the First Amendment freedoms have
a preferred place in our constitutional scheme of things. (Pp. 231-240,
311-312) He rejects this conception that appears to him to place a high
value on First Amendment freedoms as the kind of judicial subjectivity
that led the Court astray in an earlier day. He agrees with Justice Frankfurter that judges have no business saying that some constitutional limitations are more important than others. Elevation of free speech to a position
of primary importance is as much an abuse of judicial authority as the
earlier judicial attempts to place economic liberty on a high pedestal.
(Pp. 237-238)
In accordance with this same philosophy he is critical of the type of
individualism that has distinguished the Court in recent years. He regards
the great plethora of separate opinions-dissenting and concurring-as
a factor weakening the Court's prestige and impairing its effectiveness and

14 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819).
2 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
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dignity as a collegiate body. (Pp. 354-362) Dissenting opinions in Professor
Schwartz's view should be written only under very special circumstances
where the expression of a separate opinion will be a positive contribution
to the development of the law, and even then the privilege of dissent
should be exercised with a sense of responsibility and self-restraint. (Pp. 360362) Moreover, in the interest of stability the Court should be slow to
overrule well established precedents, and the rule of stare decisis should
be generally observed by the Court in the field of constitutional adjudication except when it is clear that prior decisions rested on an erroneous
exercise of judicial power.3 Accordingly, Professor Schwartz has little
patience with the Black-Douglas attempt to revive the questions whether
corporations are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment (Pp. 350-351)
or whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be equated with the Bill
of Rights as distinguished from the classic interpretation in terms of fundamental rights. (Pp. 163-167) Respecting Justice Black's dissenting opinion
in the Adamson case, 4 Professor Schwartz questions the propriety of Justice
Black's resting his conclusions on his own interpretation of history when
this whole question of historical intent was not briefed or argued before
the Court and did not receive full consideration by all the members of
the Court at that time.
Space does not permit any detailed review of Professor Schwartz's
comments on all the specific cases he discusses in the course of his various
chapters. He reviews the judicial decisions relating to the powers of
Congress, the powers of the President, administrative agencies, the place of
the courts, the states, the individual, the war power, the cold war, and
concludes with a chapter entitled "Anatomy and Pathology of the Court,"
the chapter in which he discusses stare decisis in constitutional adjudication,
activism, dissenting opinions (Dissentio ad Absurdum), liberalism vs.
conservatism on the bench, and the general subject of judicial deference to
the legislative will. The reader will find the chapters provocative and
rewarding. Although a detailed review will not be attempted, attention
will be called to some of his criticisms and comments as set forth. below
in order to give the reader some idea of the book's flavor and the author's
thinking.
While it must be recognized that Congress under the Commerce Clause
has a broad power of regulation over the nation's economy, it is questionable whether this power should be so widely construed by applying

s The author approves of .the Court's post-1937 overruling of prior decisions restricting the reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and limiting federal
and state legislative power to deal with economic problems by reference to the economic
liberty concept developed under the Due Process Clause, since in his opinion these
decisions represented an overreaching of the judicial power at the expense of legislative
power to deal with new situations and marked a departure from the earlier and correct.
policy of judicial deference to legislative judgment in policy-making areas.
4 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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a theory of interrelation of all economic activities that the distinction
between national and local commerce is completely obliterated. (P. 39)
The Court's decision in the Kahriger case5 in effect permits Congress
to make a spurious use of the taxing power as a means of regulating
criminal activity that should be left to the states. (Pp. 51-53) The congressional investigatory power is important, and the Supreme Court should
be very slow to interfere with the internal function of a coordinate branch
of the government. (Pp. 53-57) (It would be interesting to get Professor
Schwartz's comments on the recent Watkins case6 holding invalid contempt
convictions based on refusal to answer questions put by a congressional
committee.)
'
According to the author, the Court has shown undue deference to
the executive authority. (Pp. 64-70) The steel seizure decision7 is approved
as a desirable affirmation of judicial power to curb the executive in order
to maintain the supremacy of Congress in the determination of legislative
policy. (Pp. 76-81, 94) The Court has shown extreme tolerance in dealing
with executive power so far as the handling of foreign affairs is concerned.
Professor Schwartz points out that the Court went out of its way in the
Belmont and Pink cases8 to broaden the legal significance of executive
agreements and to elevate these agreements to the level of treaties in
overriding state law and policy. (Pp. 86-93) Because he feels that it is
in the sphere of executive review of administrative action that the courts
have a very useful function to perform, Professor Schwartz, after observing
that Congress in recent years has granted authority to administrative
agencies in such broad terms that for all practical purpose it amounts to
the granting of carte blanche power to these agencies to define policy,
notes with apparent regret that the Court has virtually repudiated the
idea that Congress cannot delegate its power without setting up some
meaningful standards which serve as barriers to the aggrandizement of
administrative authority. (Pp. 102-108) The author is also critical of the
attitude taken by the post-1937 Court in deference to administrative
agencies and its resulting reluctance to review the actions of these agencies.
(Pp. 108-120) Judicial deference to the legislature does not require the
courts "to leave everything to the administrative expert." (P. 139) Professor
Schwartz is enthusiastic about the Administrative Procedure Act, is glad
that the courts have given it a sympathetic interpretation and is hopeful
that they will continue to do so in the interest of furnishing a more effective vehicle of judicial review that will limit the opportunities for the
arbitrary exercise of administrative authority. (Pp. 120-139)

United States v. K.ahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
s United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942).
5

6 Watkins v. United
7 Youngstown Sheet
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In his chapter entitled "The Individual," the author, while rejecting
the idea that the First Amendment freedoms are preferred and while
commending the Court for the more recent rejection of this idea (Pp. 231240), examines and approves the decisions invalidating restrictions on
Jehovah's Witnesses (Pp. 240-245), criticizes the Struthers decision9 as a
doctrinaire application of the First Amendment freedoms without taking
into account the importance of preserving the privacy of the home
(Pp. 248-249), approves the later decisions which have restored state control over picketing as against the Thornhill doctrine10 that this was protected free speech (Pp. 250-253), approves the application of the free press
limitation to the movies and feels that movies should not be subject to
prior restraint any more than any other medium of expression (Pp. 253257), and rejects the absolute application of the separation-of-church-andstate concept but disapproves of the result in the Zorach case.11 (Pp. 256263) So far as equal protection of the Negro is concerned, the author is clear
that under the post-Civil War amendments race furnishes no basis for
classification and that the recent decisions including the desegregation
decisions must be supported as a proper performance by the Court of its
duty to enforce constitutional limitations. (Pp. 263-275)
Legislative efforts to combat the subversive activity come in for consideration in the chapter on the cold war period. The Dennis decision12
is approved as another instance of judicial deference in an area where the
judgment of Congress on the need and desirability of restrictions must
be given great weight. (Pp. 308-319) Attacking the procedures used in
the loyalty-security program relating to federal employees, procedures
which permit the use of "faceless" informers and which can be justified
only by reference to the discredited dogma that public employment is a
privilege and not a right, the author regrets that the Court has not used
its most recent opportunities to condemn these procedures on the ground
that they violate constitutional right. (Pp. 323-329) However, the decision
in the Cole case13 resting on statutory grounds, has contributed to the
end result of developing a more equitable and effective program. (Pp. 329331) The decisions permitting the use of confidential information in the
selective service and deportation cases are characterized as administrative
law distortions that reflect upon our traditions of fair play. (Pp. 331-335)
In his comments on the Rosenberg case,14 the author, while not doubting
the justice of the end result, asserts that the Supreme Court acted with
undue haste in its handling of the matter. (Pp. 335-341)
It is not possible within the limits of this review to pass judgment on

9

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

10 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
11 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
12 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
13 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
14 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
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Professor Schwartz's conclusions on the various matters including those
mentioned above. It is enough to say that his book evidences an astute
understanding of the development of our constitutional case law during the
past two decades, that his discussion is well organized and that his comments are always penetrating, illuminating and interesting. Perhaps the
favorable impression made on the reviewer by the book is due to the fact
that he shares many of the author's conclusions.
By way of general comment it should be noted that Professor Schwartz
probably is somewhat premature in announcing that the Court is now
following an overall policy of self-restraint. Indeed, it may be assumed
in the light of the Court's overall performance that the degree of selfrestraint exercised by it will vary from time to time depending on the
Court's personnel. The decisions announced during the past term of the
Court, as presently constituted under Chief Justice Warren, evidence
considerable "activism" as opposed to self-restraint. One may note, for
instance, the decision in the Watkins case,15 resulting in a substantial
practical limitation on the power of congressional committees to ask
questions, the decisions denying to Congress the power to authorize military
trials for civilian dependents accompanying members of the armed forces
abroad,16 and the decision in the Yates case17 which while not formally
resting on constitutional grounds has the practical effect of undermining
the Dennis decision. These decisions hardly evidence a policy of judicial
austerity premised on deference to congressional power and policy.
Secondly, the problem of the judicial function in respect to adjudication
of constitutional issues cannot be resolved in the neat and clear-cut manner indicated by Professor Schwartz's formula. He would have the Court
declare legislation invalid only if it conflicts with specific limitations or
is an unreasonable exercise of power in the Holmesian sense. 18 (P. 59)
Yet the judicial solution to constitutional questions by reference to these
two standards as guides to the judicial process is not simple; it requires
the exercise of judgment and calls for a balancing of the ends served by
legislative policy as against the rights that are claimed to be violated.
Judicial enforcement of "specific restraints" is a more complex task

15 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
16 Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Kxueger, 354 U.S. I (1957).
17 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
18 At several points the author seems to make clear that

in his opinion it is appropriate for the Court to review the "reasonableness" of legislation in the sense of inquiring whether there is some rational basis for the legislation. On the other hand, he
seems to approve what he regards as the Court's present policy of self-restraint _pursuant
to which it will uphold legislation unless it "patently violates an express constitutional
provision." (P. 23) Judicial review of the "reasonableness" of legislation obviously in.
volves a wider power of review than that limited to the inquiry whether the legislation
violates a specific constitutional limitation. The difference between the two is indicated
by the difference between Justice Roberts' opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
!;102 (1934), and Justice Black's opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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than the word "specific" suggests. Explicit constitutional limitations
assume various degrees of specificity. The right to a jury trial can be given
a very specific content by reference to the common law definition of the
institution. On the other hand, the First Amendment limitations, often
characterized as specific restraints when contrasted with the generality of
the Due Process Clause, open up large vistas of meaning and interpretation.
Does obscene literature enjoy protection under the First Amendment and
to what extent may Congress use its powers under the Commerce Clause
to curb the distribution of this kind of literature? It is quite clear that
in answering these questions the Court must appraise and weigh opposing
interests of considerable importance. Does deference to legislative judgment or does judicial concern for the value embodied in the specific restraint control the decision?
Likewise, judicial review of the "reasonableness" of the exercise of
legislative power calls for a pragmatic balance-of-interest judgment that
must of necessity take some account of the wisdom, necessity and justice
of legislative policy. Nor is it conclusive to use Holmes' reasonable man
test, i.e., would a rational man say that this is a reasonable way to deal
with the problem? Even this test involves a considerable measure of
judicial subjectivity. Who is to determine the thinking of the rational
man? He is an abstraction, and in the end the judge creates an image of
the rational man by reference to the judge's own conception of rationality.
In other words when a judge says that a rational man would regard a
given legislative act as reasonable, he is really saying that the judge finds
that rational arguments can be made to support the objectives of the legislation and the means employed to effectuate these objectives. This is of
course far different from saying that the judge thinks that the legislation
is desirable or right. On the other hand, the inquiry into reasonableness
is meaningless unless it penetrates to the grounds that lead the legislature
to conclude that this is wise, desirable and just legislation.19 At this point
the judge is thrown upon his own resources and the frame of reference
within which he operates. Judges may therefore disagree on the rationality
of legislation. The difference between the Holmes and Brandeis opinions in

19 At one point the author appears to recognize that a review of reasonableness of
legislation involves some judgment as to the desirability of the legislation. "In applying
a test as vague and indefinite as the above-i.e., is the statute unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary?-the Court was, in effect, determining upon its own judgment whether
particular legislation was desirable.'' (P. 14)
It appears to this reviewer that the author in developing this particular point has
overstated the matter when he says that the Court prior to 1937 had set itself up "as Supreme Censor of the wisdom of challenged legislation." (P. 23) It may appear to the author
that the Court in passing on the "reasonableness" of legislation must necessarily have
been passing on the wisdom of the statute, but this reviewer doubts that any justice
of the Court would ever assert or defend the proposition that it was the Court's function
to serve as a super-legislature in passing final judgment on the wisdom of legislative
policy.
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the Pennsylvania Coal Company case20 well illustrates this point, since in
this case two judges 9f great wisdom differed on whether a rational man
would regard the Pennsylvania legislation under review as a reasonable
way to deal with the problem of land subsidence induced by extraction
of minerals.
The reviewer has no quarrel with the test of "reasonableness." Reflecting as it does the balance-of-interest technique in the process of constitutional adjudication, it appears to the reviewer to be a more meaningful
approach than one couched in the ·language of absolutism or doctrinal
conceptualism. The point he is making is that "reasonableness" as a
standard for the operation of the judicial process is not to be equated
with a mechanical objectivity. On the contrary, it calls for a determination
by the judge by reference to his own lights, his understanding and appraisal
of the interests at stake, and the basic frame of values that condition his
intellectual process.
Likewise it appears to the reviewer that Professor Schwartz in attempting to objectify the process of constitutional adjudication by insisting on
the impropriety of judicial appraisal of values is putting himself in a
position where he appears to be an advocate of a mechanistic process of
judgment in constitutional adjudication. The factors leading him to
protest constitutional value appraisals by the judges are understandable.
His criticism of the thesis that the First Amendment freedoms are preferred
freedoms is well taken. Such a dogmatic statement is in itself a mechanical
approach to the values and interests served by the First Amendment.
Furthermore, Professor Schwartz is concerned with the divisiveness, individualism, and subjectivity that result when each judge interprets the Constitution in such a way as to make it an image of his own sense of constitutional values. The reviewer shares this concern too. But the reviewer cannot
conceive of any rational process of constitutional adjudication in which
the judge's conception of the values and interests served by the constitutional system, and their relevancy and importance in the context of our
contemporary political, social and economic order, can be eliminated
from the decisional process.
Professor Schwartz's own comments respecting many of the Court's
decisions are based on his conception of important interests served by the
Constitution and by his choice of the predominant interest that should
govern the resolution of the problem presented by the case. One may
note, for instance, his disapproval (Pp. 262-263) of the decision in the
Zorach case21 sustaining the validity of the New York system of released
time. Here the immediate issue is whether a system which permits the
release on a voluntary basis of school children at the expense of one hour
per week of public school time for the purpose of religious education

20 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
21 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

393 (1922).
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deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. A judicial policy which defers to legislative judgment respecting the
wisdom and desirability of this practice and which limits the judicial
inquiry to the question whether a rational man would regard this practice as a reasonable means of reconciling the claims to personal liberty
with the public's interest in opportunities for religious education points
to the result reached in the Zorach case. But if it is argued that the real
question is whether this practice violates the separation-of-church-and-state
concept derived from the First Amendment, it should be observed that
the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment itself represents a judicial determination that the First Amendment
restrictions are essential to a system of ordered justice and are fundamental
in character. This determination in itself represents an important judicial
choice of basic values. In tum the significance of the separation concept in
its application to the released time problem calls for a considerable
exercise of judicial judgment in identifying, appraising and weighing
the competing interests at stake. If Professor Schwartz thinks that the released time system should be held unconstitutional, it is because he has
made his choice of the relevant constitutional value that should control
the disposition of the case.
The author recognizes that judges do and should draw upon a sense
of natural justice that finds its inspiration in the conscience and basic
human feelings. (Pp. 170-171) On this ground he defends the Supreme
Court's interpretation of due process in terms of fundamental or natural
rights and takes issue with Justice Black's criticism as expressed in his
dissent in the Adamson case22 that the fundamental rights interpretation
leaves constitutional questions at the mercy of uncontrolled judicial subjectivity. Answering this criticism, Professor Schwartz states that the
judge "can be expected both to be keenly perceptive to violations of basic
canons of justice and to be sufficiently detached to avoid imposing his
purely personal notions, not shared by other men, upon society." (P. 171)
Although this appears to the reviewer to be a good answer, it must still
be conceded that the judge's sensitivity to basic human values, as crystallized in his own thinking and understanding, becomes a vehicle of constitutional interpretation.
But granted that the value (or policy) judgment is inevitably a part of
the judicial process, Professor Schwartz is on solid ground in contending
that the judicial judgment must be a disciplined and responsible judgment and not simply a reflection of personal idiosyncrasies or predilections.
Respect for the testimony of history in illuminating and authenticating
the meaning of constitutional language, for the principles and traditions
established by past decisions, for the institutional role of the judiciary and
the stability and steadfastness essential to the maintenance of public con22 Adamson

v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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fidence in the judicial arm of the government, for the underlying policy
and structural objectives of the Constitution, for the rule of law and the
values implicit in the concept of ordered justice-all these, coupled with
wholesome respect for the pivotal position of the democratic political
process and the institutions of representative government in the formulation of social and economic policies, are controlling and restraining forces
which serve to correct excessive judicial subjectivity.
The reader will have reached the conclusion by this time that Professor Schwartz's latest book not only presents an able analysis and synthesis
of the Supreme Court's decisions during the past two decades in the important areas of constitutional law, but also yields critical and illuminating
observations on the judidal process at work in constitutional litigation.
This is a good book and one that can be recommended not only for
lawyers, law teachers and students, but also for the lay reader who has a
sober and reflective interest in the new directions taken by our constitutional law and the role of the Supreme Court in the process of constitutional adjudication.
Paul G. Kauper,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

